FORUM
Umpiring the cosmethics business

From 'Philosophy at Cambridge'
Issue 1, May 2004.

Philosophy's reputation for ethereal contemplation is as old as the subject itself. Yet many philosophers have engaged directly in the practical world-Locke, Smith, Bentham, Mill and Russell are obvious examples.
The truth is that, for all its abstractions, philosophy confronts issues underlying many decisions now facing professionals, business leaders and policy makers.
Trust in business, government and the media is sharply declining.
Forms of managerial accountability are supposed to restore it. But the resulting 'audit explosion' has done more harm than good, and trust keeps declining.
In her 2002 Reith Lectures, Onora O'Neill viewed the problem from a philosophical perspective. Autonomous individuals should place trust intelligently, not blindly.
Intelligent trust requires evidence of trustworthiness, but this evidence is not automatically delivered by accountability, if that simply means demanding ever more information.
Information must be intelligible and its authors properly interrogated, otherwise opacity, not transparency, will result.
Before steps can be taken to restore trust, O'Neill shows the need to think through these concepts of trust, accountability and transparency.
Her views are now resonating with practitioners.
There are many other cases where addressing abstract problems can lead to practical results.
Intellectual property is a topical example. Lawyers and economists dominate the field. Yet at its heart lie conceptual distinctions that need philosophical attention.
For example, there is increasing pressure to patent gene sequences-how else can businesses be persuaded to invest in research and development?
Legally, only inventions, not discoveries, are patentable. So isolated sequences are now being treated as inventions. But the arguments for this move are specious.
It is also surprising that much of the argument about intellectual property rights simply assumes utilitarianism, a theory which Bernard Williams* declared to be on its last legs in 1973. A premature verdict perhaps, but a good dose of scepticism about the theory would certainly enhance the debate.
Another example is 'corporate social responsibility' (CSR).
Corporate websites are awash with talk of responsibilities to society and the environment. But disagreement is also rife.
While BP and Shell are CSR devotees, ExxonMobil's Chairman protests-"we don't invest to make social statements at the expense of shareholder return".
Milton Friedman denounced CSR as "pure and adulterated socialism", yet the left complains that it usurps the proper role of government.
Behind these political quarrels are questions about the coherence of ascribing corporate responsibilities, and about the proper way to discharge them.
There is also a problem of trust here. CSR talk is easily construed as cynical PR-looking good rather than being good. Call it the 'cosmethics business'.
And why trust corporations which seek ethical reputations, when individuals doing the same would be deemed smug and opportunistic?
These examples show that philosophy can and should do more to engage with practical problems.

For more information- www.phil.cam.ac.uk

* A well-known UK philosopher